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To fulfill their crucial duty of relieving suffering in their patients, physicians may have to administer palliative
sedation when they implement treatment-limitation decisions such as the withdrawal of life-supporting
interventions in patients with poor prognosis chronic severe brain injury. The issue of palliative sedation deserves
particular attention in adults with serious brain injuries and in neonates with severe and irreversible brain lesions,
who are unable to express pain or to state their wishes. In France, treatment limitation decisions for these patients
are left to the physicians. Treatment-limitation decisions are made collegially, based on the presence of irreversible
brain lesions responsible for chronic severe disorders of consciousness. Before these decisions are implemented,
they are communicated to the relatives. Because the presence and severity of pain cannot be assessed in these
patients, palliative analgesia and/or sedation should be administered. However, palliative sedation is a complex
strategy that requires safeguards to prevent a drift toward hastening death or performing covert euthanasia. In
addition to the law on patients’ rights at the end of life passed in France on April 22, 2005, a recent revision of
Article 37 of the French code of medical ethics both acknowledges that treatment-limitation decisions and
palliative sedation may be required in patients with severe brain injuries and provides legal and ethical safeguards
against a shift towards euthanasia. This legislation may hold value as a model for other countries where euthanasia
is illegal and for countries such as Belgium and Netherlands where euthanasia is legal but not allowed in patients
incapable of asking for euthanasia but in whom a treatment limitation decision has been made.
Introduction: why use palliative sedation?
Every year, millions of people with serious diseases, as
well as their loved ones, are confronted with decisions
relating to the quality of the time that remains to be
lived. The quality of the end of life may be severely
altered by pain or other distressing symptoms. Physi-
cians have a duty to relieve suffering in their patients.
However, in most countries, they are not allowed to
intentionally shorten life, although treatments given to
relieve suffering are permitted even if they are also
expected to shorten life (double-effect principle). A
major challenge faced by physicians is to honour their
patients’ wishes and values and to help them safeguard
their dignity and peace at the end of life.
Some seriously ill patients, such as those with severe
brain injuries, are unable to communicate their suffering.
In these patients, the effectiveness of palliative care cannot
be assessed: the possibility of persistent suffering cannot
be ruled out [1]. There is a wide consensus that palliative
sedation is appropriate as a last resort in this situation [2].
However, palliative sedation is a complex intervention that
is closer to physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active
euthanasia than is ordinarily acknowledged. Safeguards are
needed whenever a medical intervention may hasten
death. Legislation stating which practices are permissible
would reassure the numerous patients who fear a “bad”
death and would improve practice uniformity among phy-
sicians [3]. The French law on patients’ rights and the end
of life passed on April 22, 2005 (Law n° 2005-370, known
as the Leonetti law) [4] indicates that patients should be
allowed to die as comfortably and peacefully as possible
but should not be made to die. This law reflects the evolu-
tion of French medical thinking about the best means of
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from intentionally causing death. It has also led to further
ethical discussions, most notably about palliative sedation
after treatment-limitation decisions in patients with severe
brain injuries. Thus, a committee evaluated the Leonetti
law and revised the article of the French Code of Medical
Ethics relating to the relief of suffering [5]. These issues
were specifically addressed during multiple hearings in the
French Parliament [6].
Specific issues raised by suffering in patients with
severe brain injuries
Severely brain-injured patients who are unable to com-
municate are at high risk for suffering. More specifically,
the ability to perceive pain has been well documented in
patients who are in a minimally conscious state [1,7,8],
in whom suffering is very difficult to assess [9]. In these
patients, when treatment-limitation decisions are made
based on the clinical findings and results of investiga-
tions, the potential appropriateness of palliative sedation
is an extremely relevant issue [10]. The possible need
for palliative sedation deserves special attention when
patients are taken off mechanical ventilation and either
extubated or decannulated, as well as when nutrition
and hydration are stopped in patients with chronic con-
sciousness disorders [11]. Currently available scientific
knowledge usually does not allow the distinction
between unconscious nervous reactions and pain per-
ception in most such patients [1], and the possibility of
“unconscious pain” has been raised [12], generating con-
siderable interest in the issue of palliative sedation. The
goal of palliative sedation started before or at the time
life-supporting treatments are withdrawn is to eliminate
pain perception and neurological responses that might
result from treatment withdrawal. In this situation, pal-
liative sedation is a gesture of humanity towards both
the patient and the family members, whose primary
request is that their loved one does not suffer. Palliative
sedation can thus represent an appropriate form of pal-
liative care.
The nature of palliative sedation and the
differences with euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide
The concept of sedation does not have a precise medical
content. Literally, “to sedate” means to alleviate suffer-
ing. The definition of palliative sedation remains vividly
debated, particularly regarding the presence or absence
of an intention to hasten death [13]. Palliative sedation
i sd e f i n e db ys o m ea u t h o r sa st h eu s eo fd r u g st op u t
the patient in a state of comfort and unawareness of his
or her situation without intentionally hastening death
[14]. The level of palliative sedation varies with the
drugs used, and the above-mentioned definition covers
the continuum from simply keeping the patient asleep
to inducing an artificial coma. Inducing an artificial
coma, which can be described as major sedation, may
be indispensable in the event of treatment limitations
such as the withdrawal of life-supporting interventions.
Major palliative sedation has complex links with treat-
ment withdrawal, as underlined in the parliamentary
report on the evaluation of the Leonetti law (p. 204-216)
[ 1 5 ] .( R a p p o r td el am i s s i o nd ’évaluation de la loi n°
2005-370 du 22 avril 2005). Palliative sedation has been
criticized as being a slow, disguised, and socially accep-
table form of euthanasia [16-21]. Other authors endorse
the “double effect” principle [14,22,23], acknowledging
that a shorter time to death is a possible side effect of
palliative care [24,25].
The main difference between physician-assisted sui-
cide or euthanasia and palliative sedation lies in the pre-
sence or absence of an intention to hasten death and
t h ep r e c i s ek n o w l e d g eo ft h ep a t i e n t ’sw i s h e s[ 2 3 ] .T h e
strict definition of euthanasia retained by the Dutch and
Belgian laws is “the intentional taking of someone’sl i f e
by another, at his request”. In palliative sedation, the
drug dosages are increased on l yu n t i lt h es u f f e r i n gi s
alleviated. The intention in palliative sedation is to fully
protect the patient from pain. There is no intention to
hasten death. In addition, palliative sedation is reversi-
ble, whereas death caused by an overdose of sedatives is
not [26]. Allowing a patient to die at some point may
constitute a practical necessity if medical care is to be
given successfully, but the same is not true of physician-
assisted suicide [27]. Moreover, support for palliative
sedation is widespread among internists. Most physi-
cians who view palliative sedation favourably do not
support physician-assisted suicide and feel that these
two practices are on different sides of the line separating
the ethical from the unethical [28].
The French context
T h ei s s u eo fe n d - o f - l i f ec a r ew a sl o n gn e g l e c t e db y
French law. Healthcare providers could rely only on the
French code of medical ethics, which required that they
“refrain from any unreasonable obstinacy in investiga-
tions or treatments” while reminding them solemnly
that they had “no right to cause death intentionally”
(Article 38, Additional file 1). This last provision was
the translation to the medical ethics field of Penal Code
laws prohibiting homicide. The French Code of Medical
Ethics is part of the Public Health Code and has the
force of law.
In addition to requiring that healthcare providers
respect patients’ decisions to stop treatment, the Leo-
netti law allows physicians to make treatment withdra-
wal decisions for patients who are “unable to express
their wishes” (Articles L. 1111-4 and L. 1111-13), as a
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decisions are preceded by consultation of all medical
team members, any advance directives written by the
patient, and the close relatives, and are considered
appropriate by an external consultant [4]. French inten-
sive care societies view tube feeding as a life-sustaining
treatment whose withdrawal is advisable when all treat-
ments except comfort care are stopped.
When a decision is made to withdraw treatments
intended to prolong life, the physician must bear in
mind that the law authorizes the withdrawal of such
treatments only with the condition that any additional
suffering potentially caused by treatment withdrawal will
be completely eliminated by palliative care.
French legislation on palliative sedation
A parliamentary mission known as the Leonetti Mission
was appointed by the French government to assess the
implementation of the 2005 law. It released its conclu-
sions in late 2008. The Leonetti Mission called into
question the adequacy of palliative care in severely
brain-injured patients with treatment-limitation deci-
sions taken in a collegial manner. In some of these
patients, pain is not readily assessable and the existence
of pain cannot be ruled out. In 2006 in France, a young
man in a vegetative state whose gastric tube was with-
drawn without preliminary sedation died only 6 days
later after experiencing multiple seizures that caused
severe distress to the family. This case, together with
the Leonetti Mission conclusions, promoted a revision
of Article 37 of the French code of medical ethics. A
paragraph was added to this article to require the use of
sedation and/or analgesia to eliminate any suffering pos-
sibly caused by treatment withdrawal in patients with
brain damage precluding a reliable evaluation of pain
perception. The revision of Article 37 was released in
January 2010 (Additional file 2). The use of sedation/
analgesia under the conditions of transparency and col-
legiality required by the law will now ensure that
patients do not suffer, particularly those in neurointen-
sive care units or neonatology wards. On the legal level,
this new requirement confirms the right of patients to
palliative care, as stated by article L. 1110-9 of the Pub-
lic Health Code. It reminds physicians of their duty to
respect the patient’s right to receive palliative care,
including major palliative sedation when considered pro-
portionate to the patient’s potential suffering.
Situations involving severe brain injury are not all
identical. Current legislation in France is based on the
principle of proportionality. Physicians must choose
among available treatments those that are proportionate
to the patient’s condition. Thus, useless treatments must
be stopped and palliative strategies selected according to
the patient’s needs. Among these strategies, deep
palliative sedation is allowed by the revised law to elimi-
nate potential suffering in patients whose predicted
neurological outcome dictates the withdrawal of life-
supporting treatments. The physician must select the
level of sedation that is proportionate to the suffering
endured, or possibly endured, by each individual patient.
In patients with severe brain injuries, the presence and
intensity of the pain cannot be reliably assessed and,
consequently, the proportionate amount of sedation
cannot be determined. The French Board of Physicians
has stated that “the goal is to provide patients with
severe brain injuries precluding a reliable evaluation of
suffering with the same level of relief as that received by
patients who are able to communicate.” The law
requires documentation in the medical files of all the
information needed to make the decision. In other
words, the decision must be substantiated.
French law affords legal and ethical safeguards
against a shift towards euthanasia
The Leonetti Mission recommended that the Code of
Medical Ethics specify the sedation modalities that must
accompany the withdrawal of life-supporting treatments
in patients whose pain perceptions cannot be assessed.
The principle of proportionality of sedation is deemed
to protect against the use of sedation with the intention
of causing death [29].
The hospital staff may sometimes decide to use seda-
tion because no palliative care team is available to
ensure analgesia and to accompany the dying patient.
However, deep sedation is in no case a substitute for
palliative care, i.e. an easy solution intended to compen-
sate to some extent for the absence of palliative care.
Using deep sedation as a substitute for palliative care
disregards the principle of proportionality on which the
Leonetti law is based.
Transparency of the decision-making process, collegial
decision making, information of the relatives, and docu-
mentation of the entire decision-making process in the
medical files are legal requirements that constitute safe-
guards against the inappropriate use of palliative seda-
tion. The support and guidance provided by the
healthcare team to the family are invaluable in helping
the family to accept the last phase of their loved one’s
life.
Difficulties, concerns, and reservations
Technical concerns
- Indication for sedation/analgesia: A crucial challenge is
determining which non-communicating brain-injured
patients need palliative sedation. Classical clinical cri-
teria for possible pain consist of high blood pressure,
tachycardia, tachypnea, wincing, and motor reactions to
noxious stimuli [9]. An EEG or functional MRI response
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these methods for identifying patients who require seda-
tion/analgesia has not been assessed. It seems that only
patients in a minimally conscious state can perceive
pain and anxiety and therefore usually require analgesics
and sedatives [1]. In contrast, patients in a persistent
vegetative state can process noxious stimuli only as far
as the primary cortex level, which remains disconnected
from the level involved in pain sensation, so that no
pain is felt [9]. However, the exact nature of the con-
sciousness disorder may be extremely difficult to deter-
mine, at least at some points in time [30]. Patients who
seem calm and have no hemodynamic or neurological
signs of pain probably do not need sedation. Indeed,
similar to other medical procedures at the end of
life, palliative sedation should meet criteria for prudent
practice [31].
- Continuous sedation has several drawbacks and pit-
falls. The criteria used to assess the depth and appropri-
ateness of sedation deserve discussion. Sedation can
preclude an assessment of the neurological status of the
patient by altering the neurological findings from one
evaluation to the next. In addition, the accumulation in
the body of drugs used to achieve lasting sedation may
lead to oversedation. Thus, drugs with short half-lives
deserve preference for palliative sedation.
Ethical concerns
Palliative sedation has been criticized by some authors
as a disguised form of euthanasia [17,32]. Others, such
as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in
1997, have endorsed the practice, arguing that “a patient
who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is
experiencing great pain has no legal barrier to obtaining
medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that
pain, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and
hastening death” [33].
One of the major objections to terminal sedation is that
its intention may be to kill the patient in order to alleviate
the symptoms, i.e., to seek the double effect instead of just
accepting it [34]. The goal of palliative care, by contrast, is
to relieve pain, although drugs such as opioids can shorten
life. Intent is crucial in law and in ethics, and the double-
effect principle states that the foreseeable adverse conse-
quences of treatment are acceptable only if they are unin-
tended [24]. However, a Dutch study has established that
many physicians who use palliative sedation do so with
the conscious intention of ending their patients’ lives,
inducing a coma and withholding life-sustaining treatment
as a form of “slow euthanasia” [16] that is more acceptable
to them and to their patients’ families than direct euthana-
sia [35]. A second objection is that palliative sedation may
be used without the patient’s consent and that this situa-
tion is indistinguishable from involuntary euthanasia [36].
A descriptive study conducted in the Netherlands by Riet-
jens and colleagues [37] to assess physician behaviour
toward patients near the end of life found that patients or
their surrogates did not always give their informed con-
sent. Although French law does not require informed con-
sent, the French Board of Physicians has stated in
comments on the code of medical ethics that “Transpar-
ency is of the highest importance and there should be no
doubt in anyone’s mind that the decision was pondered
carefully and discussed extensively. At all the stages of the
procedure, the person of trust or family or, if either is una-
vailable, close friends must be informed of the issues, steps
taken, decisions made, and reasons for those decisions.
They must be consulted and heard, and their requests -
even if they cannot always be satisfied - must be welcomed
and considered.” A third objection is that physicians may
use palliative sedation even when other ethically preferable
interventions are feasible [38]. Pain was the most common
reason for palliative sedation in the study by Rietjens and
colleagues, although state-of-the-art palliative care can
provide satisfactory pain control in 90% of cases [37].
Dutch physicians acknowledge that their intent is to end
life and do not uniformly seek less drastic approaches to
alleviate suffering [37]. The guidelines on palliative seda-
tion used in many countries require confirmation of the
prognosis, consideration of alternative approaches, and
collection of informed consent before starting the proce-
dure [39]. Only when these requirements are met consis-
tently will palliative sedation be truly a treatment of last
resort.
Potential interaction with non-heart beating donation
and risks of drift
The patients to whom Article 37 applies are potential
type III non-heart-beating (NHB) donors according to
the Maastricht classification, that is, potential donors
awaiting cardiac arrest after withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatments in the intensive care unit because of a poor
neurological prognosis [40]. Some authors believe that
severely brain-injured patients who are dependent on
mechanical ventilation but do not meet criteria for brain
death are good candidates for NHB organ donation and
that terminal sedation is a component of the care given
to these NHB donors [41]. French organ donation
authorities consider that there can be a conflict of inter-
est between treatment limitation and organ donation
and have instituted a moratorium for organ harvesting
from Maastricht III patients. However, the issue of
organ donation by type III NHB donors is being re-
examined in France. Similarly, there may be a conflict of
interest between sedation for possible pain and cardiac
arrest for Maastricht III organ donation. Thus, palliative
sedation might come to be used to hasten death in
order to allow Maastricht III organ donation. In some
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practiced at the end of the life and Maastricht III organ
donation is allowed, physicians use major sedation in
combination with the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ments with the intent to hasten death. Thus, there
seems to be at best a very tenuous line between pallia-
tive sedation and ensuring that death occurs at a time
that will benefit a third party. Some authors claim that
this issue is not relevant if the patient is a voluntary
organ donor at the end of life and that the only impor-
tant point in this situation is achieving successful organ
transplantation [42]. Thus, whether there is a potential
conflict of interest when the patient’sd e s i r et ob ea n
organ donor is documented in advance directives or
attested to by a healthcare proxy deserves discussion.
Many other ethical problems arise. More specifically,
the patient’s desire to be an organ donor may seem to
come into conflict with allowing the patient to die with
dignity surrounded by his or her loved ones. Further-
more, compliance with the ethical principles underlying
palliative care may be difficult in a patient receiving
organ preservation procedures in the intensive care
unit. In particular, the line between terminal palliative
sedation and euthanasia is unclear when mechanical
ventilation is removed under deep sedation and neuro-
muscular-blocking agent administration, as already per-
formed in some hospitals in Belgium. In contrast,
palliative sedation as defined by the new French Article
37 must be personalized and tailored to the potential
severity of possible pain, with no intent to shorten life.
Moreover, it is still extremely difficult to establish with
complete certainty that a patient will never recover
consciousness.
Conclusion
In recent years, progress has been made in defining the
components of high-quality care for patients with severe
consciousness disorders. These components include pal-
liative care to maximize quality of life as an integral part
of the overall treatment plan, as well as clarity about the
availability of last-resort options when the presence and
intensity of pain cannot be assessed.
Indeed, there is a widespread consensus that high-
quality palliative care may fail to provide adequate relief.
In this situation, good practice requires that palliative
care include a consideration of palliative sedation [43].
The existence of brain damage that precludes an assess-
ment of pain produces a similar situation. The French
Code of medical ethics specifies that providing analgesia
and sedation as needed is a duty when treatment-limita-
tion decisions are implemented in unconscious adults or
in neonates. The purpose of recent French legislation is
to make palliative sedation available as a last resort to
all patients in France, as part of standard care.
Defining palliative sedation for non-communicating or
minimally conscious patients is crucial to ensure that a
satisfactory balance is achieved between respecting the
fundamental right of patients to have their suffering
relieved and protecting patients against a shift towards
euthanasia.
The end of life should not be synonymous with seda-
tion. Physicians must resist requests for a scheduled
death. Palliative sedation should be used only for the
right reasons, after a careful decision-making process
and in a medically and technically appropriate way [31].
We must bear in mind that palliative sedation can easily
shift to slow covert euthanasia [44]. We must continue
the time-honoured practice of refraining from deliber-
ately terminating human life [31]. The rule of propor-
tionality of the sedation to the patient’s condition and
symptoms affords a safeguard against intentionally caus-
ing or hastening death.
The recent revision of Article 37 of the French code
of medical ethics relating to relief of pain attempts to
address all concerns about the possible hazards asso-
ciated with palliative sedation. In the near future, sur-
veys will be needed to assess compliance with this
revised article in everyday practice.
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